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Wanting and Intending

Name: Wanting and Intending
Brand: Springer
SKU: 9789401773850
Price: 99.73 EUR
Availability: InStock

Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind

Autor: Neil Roughley

Jazyk:

Väzba: Pevná

Vydavateľ: Springer

Dostupnosť: Skladom u dodávateľa

Odosielame za 10-13 dní

99.73 €

This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because...

Informácie o knihe

Autor

Neil Roughley

Jazyk

Angličtina

Väzba

Kniha - Pevná

Vydalo

2016

Stránok

364

EAN

9789401773850

ISBN

9401773858

Enbook ID

09513328

Vydavateľ

Springer

Hmotnosť

7037

Rozmery

155 x 235 x 24

Kompletný popis

This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology.§§The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology.§§In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns§out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible.§§The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality.§