Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information

Name: Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information
Brand: VDM Verlag
SKU: 9783639371741
Price: 48.41 EUR
Availability: InStock

Autor: Alessandra Mainini

Jazyk:

Väzba: Brožovaná

Vydavateľ: VDM Verlag

Dostupnosť: U vydavateľa na objednávku

Odosielame za 17-27 dní

48.41 €

Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real l...

Informácie o knihe

Autor

Alessandra Mainini

Jazyk

Angličtina

Väzba

Kniha - Brožovaná

Vydalo

2011

Stránok

EAN

9783639371741

ISBN

3639371747

Enbook ID

06843885

Vydavateľ

VDM Verlag

Hmotnosť

104

Rozmery

152 x 229 x 4

Kompletný popis

Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment ŕ la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided.

Mohlo by vás zaujímať

Zákazníci, ktorí si kúpili túto knihu, kúpili tiež

Najčastejšie vyhľadávané

Categories

Authors

Publishers

Produkty

Produkty

Najčastejšie vyhľadávané

Categories

Authors

Publishers

Produkty

Produkty

Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information

Informácie o knihe

Kompletný popis

Mohlo by vás zaujímať

Zákazníci, ktorí si kúpili túto knihu, kúpili tiež